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1  Introduction 
Lucas  (1976)  has  stated  that  Cowles  Commission  models  are  not  struc 
tural,  but  he  did  not  say  that DSGE  models  are. Under  what  conditions 
would  that  be  the  case? 
Imagine  that we  had  a  doubly  long  sample  with  a  single,  unantici 
pated  once-and-for-all  policy  shift  in the middle.  To make  things  simple, 
neglect  learning  and  assume  immediate  convergence  to  a  rational 
expectations  equilibrium  after  the  regime  change.  Also  suppose  that  the 
date  of  the  change  is known,  so  that we  can  cleanly  estimate  parameters 
of  a DSGE  approximating  model  using  the  two  subsamples. 
Subject  to  regularity  conditions,  a  Bayesian  consistency  theorem 
states  that  parameter  estimates  converge  in probability  to  the  argmin  of 
the  Kullback-Liebler  information  criterion  (KLIC).1  This  probability 
limit  is  also  known  as  the  pseudo-true  value. When  the  approximating 
model  is  correctly  specified,  the  pseudo-true  values  coincide  with  the 
true  parameters.  Otherwise,  there  is an  asymptotic  bias:  the  estimates 
converge  to  something,  but  not  to  the  true  parameters. 
If  the  approximating  model  were  correctly  specified,  it would  be 
structural  in  the  sense  of  Lucas.  In  that  case,  the  estimates  would  con 
verge  to  the  truth  in both  of  the  long  subsamples.  Hence,  after  a policy 
shift,  parameters  of  the  estimated  policy  rule  would  change,  but  esti 
mates  of preference  and  technology  parameters  would  remain  the  same. 
Since  the  latter  are  invariant,  the model  could  be  trusted  to evaluate  the 
consequences  of  alternative  policies.  This  is  why  many  economists  favor 
DSGE  modeling  as  a  strategy  for  overcoming  the Lucas  critique. 
For  a misspecified  approximating  model,  invariance  of  preference 
and  technology  parameters  is not  guaranteed.  After  a policy  shift,  the  es 140  Cogley 
timated  parameters  would  adjust  to  re-optimize  the KLIC,  and  there  is 
no  reason  to expect  that  the  adjustment  would  be  confined  to policy  rule 
parameters,  with  private  sector  parameters  remaining  at  the  same  val 
ues  as  in  the  first  subsample.  All  the  parameters  are  free  to adjust  to  re 
optimize  fit, and  typically  they will  do  so.2  In order  for  estimates  of pref 
erence  and  technology  parameters  to  remain  invariant,  the  asymptotic 
bias  would  have  to be  unaffected  by  the policy  shift.  This  is a  statistical 
property  of  the model,  not  grounded  in  the  economic  bedrock  of prefer 
ence  and  technology  conditions.  If  we  take  seriously  that DSGE  models 
are  approximations,  the best  we  can  hope  for  is that preference  and  tech 
nology  estimates  won't  change  too much. 
Relatively  little  work  has  been  done  to  examine  whether  existing 
DSGE  models  are  structural.  This  is where  Fernandez-Villaverde  and 
Rubio-Ramirez  enter.  They  examine  a dynamic  new  Keynesian  model  of 
the kind  now  becoming  popular  in central  banks  and  question  whether 
its parameters  are  invariant  to  the  shifts  in  monetary  policy  experienced 
in  the United  States  over  the  last  50 years.  They  do  so by  allowing  some 
of  the model  parameters  to drift,  interpreting  drift  in private  sector  pa 
rameters  as  evidence  that  a  model  is not  structural.  Some  of  their  results 
point  to  changes  in  the monetary  policy  rule,  corroborating  findings  of 
Clarida,  Gali,  and  Gertler  (2000),  Lubick  and  Schorfheide  (2004),  and 
others.  Having  documented  shifts  in  monetary  policy,  they  go  on  to ex 
amine  the  invariance  of Calvo  pricing  parameters.  They  document  drift 
in  the  frequency  of  price  and wage  adjustment  as well  as  in  indexation 
parameters,  and  they  relate  the patterns  of  drift  to  changes  in  trend  in 
flation.  For  the most  part,  the patterns  intuitively  make  sense.3  They  con 
clude  that  the  Calvo  pricing  model  is not  structural  for  the  range  of 
monetary  policies  experienced  in  the United  States,  and  they  recom 
mend  against  using  it for policy  analysis. 
The  paper  is  technically  very  sharp,  and  it  substantially  advances 
econometric  methods  for  estimating  drifting-parameter  models.  In par 
ticular,  as  far  as  I know,  FVRR  are  the  first  to  estimate  a DSGE  model 
with  drifting  parameters.  The  main  challenge  in  estimating  such  a 
model  involves  evaluating  the  likelihood  function.  The  model  can  be 
cast  as  a nonlinear  state-space  model,  and  the  likelihood  function  can  be 
expressed  using  the  prediction-error  decomposition.  Unlike  a  linear 
state-space  model,  however,  the Kalman  filter  cannot  be  used  to evalu 
ate  the  terms  in  the  prediction-error  decomposition.  Building  on  their 
own  earlier  research,  FVRR  substitute  a nonlinear  filtering  algorithm 
known  as  a particle  filter.  Although  some  kinks  remain  to be worked  out, 
their  particle-filtering  algorithm  seems  very  promising. Comment  141 
Although  the paper  is technically  very  impressive,  I am  a bit  skeptical 
about  their  substantive  conclusions.  In particular,  I question  their  inter 
pretation  of  drift  in Calvo  pricing  parameters.  In part,  that  is because 
they  adopt  a one-at-a-time  approach  to  modeling  parameter  drift.  In ad 
dition,  other  evidence  exists  that  is  more  supportive  of  invariant  Calvo 
parameters  for  the United  States.  The  remainder  of my  comment  focuses 
on  these  issues. 
2  Are  Calvo  Pricing  Parameters  Structural? 
For  examining  the  invariance  of  Calvo  pricing  parameters,  the  ideal 
modeling  strategy  would  allow  policy  and  Calvo  parameters  to  drift 
jointly.  If  we  found  drift  in policy  parameters  but  not  in Calvo  parame 
ters, we  could  conclude  that  the  latter  were  invariant  with  respect  to 
shifts  in  the  former.  On  the  other  hand,  if Calvo  parameters  drifted  as 
well,  we  would  conclude  that  they  are  not  structural. 
This  is not  what  FVRR  do.  Instead,  they  adopt  a  one-at-a-time  ap 
proach  to  modeling  parameter  drift.  That  is,  they  estimate  a sequence  of 
approximating  models,  each  of which  involves  a  single  drifting  param 
eter while  holding  all  other  parameters  constant.  In one model,  the drift 
ing parameter  is  the  long-run  inflation  target  in  the  central  bank's  policy 
rule.  In others,  it  is one  of  the  policy-rule  feedback  parameters.  In  still 
others,  one  of  the  Calvo  wage-  or  price-adjustment  or  indexation  pa 
rameters  is free  to vary,  with  the policy-rule  parameters  held  constant. 
This  approach  is problematic  because  it does  not  reliably  identify  the 
source  of  time  variation.  For  example,  suppose  that  Clarida  et  al.  and 
Lubick  and  Schorfheide  are  correct?that  an  important  shift  in mone 
tary  policy  occurred  around  the  time  of  the Volcker  disinflation.  They 
say  that  the  Federal  Reserve  failed  to  satisfy  the  Taylor  principle  in  the 
1970s  but  did  satisfy  it after  the  early  1980s.4  Among  other  things,  this 
change  in  policy  would  alter  inflation-gap  persistence,  presumably 
making  inflation  revert  more  quickly  to  the  Fed's  long-run  target.5 
Suppose,  however,  that  the  approximating  model  held  the policy  pa 
rameters  constant  and  allowed  one  of  the Calvo  parameters?say  the 
price  indexation  parameter?to  drift.  Since  the  policy  parameters  are 
held  constant,  the  estimates  would  fail  to detect  the  change  in policy  and 
the model  would  not  identify  the  true  source  of  time-varying  inflation 
persistence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  indexation  parameter  is free  to drift, 
and  changes  in  the degree  of  indexation  after  inflation-gap  persistence. 
Since  this  feature  of  the  approximating  model  can  fit  time-varying  infla 
tion  persistence,  the  indexation  parameter  is  likely  to drift  to  compen 142  Cogley 
sate  for misspecification  of  the  policy  rule.  Fernandez-Villaverde  and 
Rubio-Ramirez  would  interpret  this  as  evidence  that  the Calvo  model  is 
not  structural.  But  in  this  example,  a Calvo  parameter  drifts  because  the 
true  source  of  time  variation  has  been  shut  off. 
My  point  is not  to argue  for  this  scenario.  I just want  to provide  an  ex 
ample  to question  FVRR's  reading  of  the  evidence.  I  would  not  jump  to 
the  conclusion  that  Calvo  models  fail  to be  invariant  to  shifts  in U.S. 
monetary  policy.  That  question  remains  open. 
Indeed,  there  is  something  odd  about  FVRR's  scenarios.  If  I under 
stand  correctly,  their  chief  concern  is  that  Calvo  parameters  might 
change  in  response  to  a  shift  in  the monetary  policy  rule.  But  in  their 
models,  whenever  Calvo  parameters  are  free  to drift,  policy  parameters 
are  held  constant.  This  makes  it hard  to attribute  drift  in Calvo  parame 
ters  to  changes  in  the monetary  policy  rule.  Their  exercise  is probably 
better  interpreted  as  a  way  to  look  for  evidence  of  state-dependent  pric 
ing within  a  stable  monetary  regime.  That  is also  interesting,  provided 
that  one  believes  the  Fed's  policy  rule  has  not  changed. 
This  criticism  is  a  bit  churlish,  because  FVRR  are  tackling  a  hard 
problem  and  are  constrained  by  what  is computationally  feasible.  The 
ideal  strategy?allowing  for  joint  drift  in  policy  and  Calvo  parame 
ters?is  computationally  very  intensive  and  seems  to be  beyond  the 
current  state  of  the  art. With  particle-filtering  algorithms,  convergence 
is hard  to  achieve  in  models  with  high-dimensional  state  vectors,  and 
that  is why  they  allow  only  one  parameter  at  a  time  to drift.  Liu  and 
West  (2001)  also  report  that  convergence  is sometimes  difficult  to attain 
when  simultaneously  filtering  for  hidden  states  and  estimating  un 
known,  constant  hyperparameters.  Convergence  is also  finicky  when  a 
model's  nonlinear  cross-equation  restrictions  permit 
more  than  one  so 
lution.  Thus,  a number  of  technical  challenges  remain.  Nevertheless, 
FVRR  are  the masters  of  the  craft within  economics,  and  I look  forward 
to  their  future  work. 
Since  the  one-parameter-at-a-time  approach  is  a  shortcut,  one 
might  ask  about  other  shortcuts.  For  instance,  Boivin  and  Giannoni 
(2005),  Canova  (2005),  and  Schorfheide  (2007)  look  for  evidence  of  pa 
rameter  shifts  by  estimating  constant-parameter  DSGE  models  for 
various  subsamples.  Cogley  and  Sbordone  (2005)  estimate  a  reduced 
form  VAR  with  drifting  parameters  and  then  estimate  Calvo  pricing 
parameters  from  the model's  cross-equation  restrictions.  Contrary  to 
FVRR,  Sbordone  and  I  find  that  a  constant-parameter  Calvo  model 
can  be  reconciled  with  time-variation  in  the  law  of motion  for  infla Comment  143 
tion  and  other  variables.  I  want  to  conclude  by  reviewing  that  evi 
dence. 
One  of  the main  findings  of  reduced-form  studies  such  as Cogley  and 
Sargent  (2005)  is  that  trend  inflation  drifts,  starting  low  in  the  1960s,  ris 
ing  during  the Great  Inflation,  and  falling  after  the Volcker  disinflation. 
Sbordone  and  I interpret  this  in  terms  of  shifts  in  the  Fed's  long-run  tar 
get  for  inflation,  and  we  incorporate  this  into  the  Calvo  model.  With 
drift  in  the  central  bank's  inflation  target,  the New  Keynesian  Phillips 
curve  (NKPC)  becomes 
*t 
~ 
&t  Vi  +  ttst+ KEt^t+i  +  bitEt  X  vii1/ftt+j 
+  ut /  (i) 
where  irt represents  inflation,  st is real marginal  cost,  and  ut is a  white  noise 
error. Hat  variables  represent  log  differences  from  time-varying  trends, 
measured  using  the  reduced-form,  time-varying-parameter  VAR  (see our 
paper  for details).  The NKPC  parameters  pt,t,t,  blt, and  cplf  are  functions  of 
trend  inflation  and  the Calvo  parameters,  v|/ 
= 
(a,  0,  p). The  parameter  a 
represents  the  frequency  of  price  adjustment,  6  is  the  elasticity  of  substi 
tution  in the Dixit-Stiglitz  aggregator,  and  p  measures  the  extent  to  which 
nonoptimizing  firms mechanically  index  to past  inflation.  The  introduc 
tion  of  drifting  trend  inflation  alters  the  standard  NKPC  in two ways:  ad 
ditional  forward-looking  inflation  terms  appear  on  the  right-hand  side  of 
(1), and  the NKPC  parameters  drift  through  time.  Note  that  the NKPC  pa 
rameters  will  drift  even  if the Calvo  parameters  are  constant.  We  are  con 
cerned  about  invariance  of  the Calvo  parameters. 
We  estimate  the model  in  two  steps.  In  the  first, we  estimate  a  time 
varying  parameter  VAR  for  inflation  and  real marginal  cost.  In  the  sec 
ond,  following  Sbordone  (2002,2005),  we  estimate  Calvo  parameters  to 
satisfy  the model's  cross-equation  restrictions.  To  derive  those  restric 
tions,  write  the VAR  in companion  form 
zt 
= 
V>t  + A  Vi  +  ezf/  (2) 
where  zt stacks  current  and  lagged  values  of  inflation  and marginal  cost, 
\Lt  includes  the VAR  intercepts,  and  At  contains  the VAR  autoregressive 
parameters.  Next,  take  the  reduced-form  conditional  expectation  of  the 
inflation  gap, 
E(*fUl_1) 
= 
<M-i/  (3) 
where  ev is a  selector  vector.  Then  take  the  conditional  expectation  for 
the  inflation  gap  from  the NKPC, 144  Cogley 
E(*i  I  Vi) 
~ 
[P< +  ?,<4  + Ke'At  +  ^:9?(/ 
" 
<PaA)-^?]Vi/  (4) 
where  es is another  selector  vector.  After  equating  the  two  and  insisting 
that  they  hold  for  all  realizations,  we  obtain  a vector  of  cross-equation 
restrictions  involving  the Calvo  parameters  v|i  and  the  drifting  VAR  pa 
rameters  juLf  and  At: 





=  0.  (5) 
In principle,  these  restrictions  should  hold  for  all  dates.  To  keep  the 
problem  to  a manageable  dimension,  we  focus  on  five  representative 
years?1961,1978,1983,1995,  and  2005?which  span  the variety  of mon 
etary  experience  in the  sample.  The  year  1961  is drawn  from  an  initial  pe 
riod  of  low  and  stable  inflation.  The  height  of  the Great  Inflation  is  rep 
resented  by  1978, when  both  trend  inflation  and  the degree  of persistence 
were  close  to  their maxima.  The  Volcker  disinflation  is  represented  by 
1983,  a key  turning  point  in postwar  U.S.  monetary  history.  The  final  two 
years,  1995  and  2003,  are  drawn  from  the Greenspan  era,  a  mature,  low 
inflation  environment.  The  first was  chosen  to represent  the preemptive 
Greenspan,  the  second  reflects  his  later wait-and-see  approach. 
We  stack  the  restrictions  at  each  date  into  a vector, 
^\)~  V*  1961 *  1978 *  1983 ^  1995 * 2003/  '  \P) 
and  then  estimate  the Calvo  parameters  a,  p, 6 by minimizing  ^(-)'^(-), 
subject  to constraints  that  they  lie  within  economically  sensible  regions.6 
For  each  draw  in  the posterior  sample  for  the VAR  parameters  \l,  A,  we 
calculate  best-fitting  values  for a,  p, thus  deducing  a distribution  for  the 
Calvo  parameters  from  the  posterior  for  the VAR  parameters.7  The  re 
sults  are  summarized  in  table  2C1.1. 
The  estimates  of a,  p, and  9 are  all  economically  sensible.  The  estimate 
of  0  implies  a  steady  state markup  of  about  11 percent,  which  is  in  line 
with  other  estimates  in  the  literature.  The  estimate  of  the  indexation  pa 
rameter  p sits  on  the  lower  bound  of  zero.  Although  this  contrasts  with 
much  of  the  empirical  literature  on  the NKPC,  we  regard  it as  a virtue 
Table  2C1.1 
Estimates  of  Calvo  Parameters 
ap6 
Median  0.602  0  9.97 
Median  absolute  deviation  0.048  0  0.90 Comment  145 
for  two  reasons.  One  is that  the microfoundations  for  indexation  are  less 
compelling  than  for other  elements  of  the Calvo  model.  The  other  is that 
there  is no  support  in  micro  data  for  indexation.  When  p >  0,  the model 
implies  that  every  firm  would  change  price  every  quarter,  some  opti 
mally  rebalancing  marginal  benefit  and marginal  cost,  others  mechani 
cally  marking  up  prices  in accordance  with  the  indexation  rule.  Yet  Bils 
and  Klenow  (2004)  report  that  approximately  75  percent  of  prices  re 
main  unchanged  every  month.  That  would  not  happen  if firms  indexed 
mechanically  to past  inflation. 
Finally,  with  p 
= 
0,  our  estimate  of  a  implies  a median  duration  of 
prices  of  1.36  quarters,  or  4.1 months,  a  value  consistent  with  micro 
economic  evidence  on  the  frequency  of  price  adjustment.  For  example, 
before  adjusting  for  sales,  Bils  and  Klenow  report  a  median  duration  of 
4.4 months.8  Our  estimate  from macroeconomic  data  therefore  accords 
well  with  the  conclusions  they  draw  from microeconomic  data. 
Most  importantly,  our  constant-parameter  Calvo  model  fists  the  time 
varying  dynamics  of  inflation  and  marginal  cost  quite  well.  Following 
Sbordone's  earlier  work,  we  assess  the model's  fit by  comparing  the  ex 
pected  inflation  gap  implied  by  the NKPC  with  the  expected  inflation 
gap  estimated  by  the  unconstrained  VAR.  The  VAR  inflation  forecast  is 
given  by  equation  (3), while  the NKPC  forecast  is defined  by  the  right 
hand  side  of  equation  (4). The  distance  between  the  two  forecasts  mea 
sures  the  extent  to which  the model's  cross-equation  restrictions  are  vi 
olated.  Figure  2C1.1  portrays  the  two  series,  plotting  the VAR  forecast  as 
a  solid  line  and  the NKPC  forecast  as  a dotted  line. 
As  the  figure  shows,  NKPC  forecasts  closely  track  those  of  the  unre 
stricted  VAR.  The  correlation  between  the  two  series  is 0.979,  and  the de 
viations  are  small  in magnitude  and  represent  high-frequency  twists 
and  turns.  Thus  the  unrestricted  VAR  satisfies  the  cross-equation  re 
strictions  implied  by  the NKPC. 
Finally,  Sbordone  and  I also  estimated  versions  of  the NKPC  that  al 
low Calvo  parameters  to vary  across  dates.  We  found  no  compelling  ev 
idence  of  changes  in a,  p, or  9, or  that  variation  in  the Calvo  parameters 
improves  the  fit  of  the model.  Thus,  we  concluded  that  a  constant 
parameter  version  of  the Calvo  model  can  be  reconciled  with  postwar 
U.S.  monetary  experience. 
Why  do we  get  a different  answer?  One  important  difference  between 
our model  and  that  of  FVRR  is  that  drift  in Calvo  parameters  is not  the 
sole  source  of  time  variation  in  the  law  of motion  for  inflation,  as  it  is  in 
their model.  Once  drift  in  trend  inflation  is accounted  for,  there  seems  to 146  Cogley 
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Figure  2C1.1 
Assessing  the Cross-Equation  Restrictions 
be  less  need  for  drift  in Calvo  parameters.  But  there  are  a number  of 
other  important  differences  as well,  and  sorting  this  out  will  require 
more  work. 
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Endnotes 
1.  See  Gelman,  Carlin,  Stern,  and  Rubin  2000,  appendix  B. 
2.  This  is one  way  to  interpret  the  subsample  estimates  of  Schorfheide  (2007). 
3.  There  are  a  few  puzzling  results.  For  instance,  actual  inflation  exceeds  target  inflation 
from  the  late  1960s  until  the  early  1980s.  It is hard  to  imagine  that  a purposeful  central  bank 
would  allow  a positive  inflation  gap  to  remain  open  for  fifteen  years. 
4.  The  evidence  on  this  is mixed,  but  let's  assume  this  for  the  sake  of  argument.  Or 
phanides  (2001)  and  Sims  and  Zha  (2006)provide  other  perspectives. 
5.  Cogley  and  Sargent  (2007)  report  empirical  evidence  that  the  inflation  gap  was  less  per 
sistent  after  the Volcker  disinflation. 
6. We  restrict  a  e  (0,1),  p e  (0,1),  6 e  (1, ?) 
7.  This  is not  a Bayesian  posterior  for  the Calvo  parameters.  It is a change  of  variables  with 
respect  to  the  reduced-form  posterior. Comment  147 
8.  Nakamura  and  Steinsson  (2006)  report  comparable  numbers.  Their  disagreement  with 
Bils  and  Klenow  concerns  sales-adjusted  durations. 
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